Unfinished projects, impunity, and diffuse responsibilities worsen the water crisis in the AMG

Diana Alonso

Two years after the El Zapotillo dam was inaugurated by then-President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, President-elect Claudia Sheinbaum, and then-Governor of Jalisco, Enrique Alfaro Ramírez, controversy persists over the amount of water that this infrastructure provides to the Guadalajara Metropolitan Area (AMG).

During the dam's inauguration in August 2024, it was announced that the Zapotillo system would deliver three cubic meters of water per second to the city, benefiting more than one million people. Alfaro stated that the project would guarantee the city's water supply for the next 50 years.

However, Julián Somoza, a consultant in hydraulics and hydrology and professor in the Department of Habitat and Urban Development (DHDU) at ITESO, argued that the available records do not support that narrative. During the conference “What Defines Who Has Water?”, he stated that the infrastructure needed to fully utilize the system is not yet complete.

“There is not a single drop of contribution from Zapotillo yet to the dam system […] that supplies the city,” he said.

The talk was part of the closing of the University Forum for Analysis of the Water Crisis in the Metropolitan Area of Guadalajara, an initiative promoted by student and academic societies of ITESO to discuss planning, supply and water quality from different disciplines.

As Somoza explained, El Zapotillo is part of a system that also includes El Salto and the Calderón network. However, its capacity depends on other facilities, including pumping stations, power generation infrastructure, the aqueduct that carries water to San Gaspar, and the capacity of Water Treatment Plant Number Three.

Based on the flows recorded at the dams, the academic questioned whether El Zapotillo was delivering the two cubic meters per second to the city as reported by the authorities. If that contribution were actually occurring, he argued, the outflow recorded at Calderón would have to be greater. “If there really were that contribution […] this outflow from Calderón that we see here should be 3.6 cubic meters per second, 0.9 cubic meters per second more than what is being reported,” he explained.

Furthermore, the electrical works necessary to operate the pumping stations are incomplete, according to records from the Superior Audit Office of the Federation: “The Audit Office […] recognizes that these works are not yet completed and, without these works, the two cubic meters per second that the federal government claims to be providing cannot be delivered.”

For Somoza, the El Zapotillo case is a clear example of the conflicts that arise when a project depends on different authorities. While the federal government assigned some of the pending work to the state government, the construction of the electrical stations and substations necessary to operate the pumping system falls under federal jurisdiction. These divided responsibilities make it difficult to determine who should complete, finance, and operate the infrastructure, as well as who is responsible when it fails to deliver the promised water.

Who sits at the water table?

Rivers, lakes, aquifers, and basins do not recognize human borders. A single water system can cross several municipalities, states, and even countries, which means its management is divided among authorities with different powers, interests, and capabilities.

Somoza explained that Article 27 of the Constitution establishes that water is a national resource. Therefore, it is the nation's responsibility to protect it and grant concessions for its extraction and use.

State governments, in accordance with their respective legislation, collaborate in the planning and construction of large-scale hydraulic works, such as dams, aqueducts, and pumping stations. For their part, Article 115 of the Constitution assigns to municipalities the provision of drinking water, drainage, sewage, and wastewater treatment and disposal services.

According to the academic, municipalities are responsible for ensuring that water "reaches your home and leaves your home." In the Guadalajara Metropolitan Area (AMG), this responsibility is exercised through the Intermunicipal System of Drinking Water and Sewerage Services (Siapa).

The problem arises in tasks that overlap or fall outside that formal distribution. Somoza called these matters, where responsibility is not fully defined, “gray areas”: “Who pays for the pumping? Who is responsible for the quality? Why aren’t there sanctions for all these discharges that are being reported, discovered, and shut down? And who arbitrates between states?” he asked.

River basin councils should function as spaces for coordination among the entities that share water resources. However, it was noted that their capacity to arbitrate decisions is not always clear.

As an example of the consequences of these ambiguities, he presented the conditions of the Lerma-Chapala basin, which has a deficit of 586 cubic hectometers in surface water and 384 cubic hectometers in aquifers. This means that the pressure exerted on water sources exceeds their availability and recharge capacity.

The basin also has 298 monitoring sites that fail to meet at least one water quality parameter. Of these, 232 are in the red zone of the classification used by the National Water Commission (Conagua), exceeding indicators of biological and chemical oxygen demand or toxicity. "These are the most degrading conditions for the environment and pose the greatest risk to human health," Somoza added.

In addition to the authorities, there are organizations that influence the discussion. One of them is the Water Advisory Council (CCA), made up of representatives from the private, social, and academic sectors. He explained that one of the criticisms of this body is that representation (and therefore, decision-making power) rests primarily with private actors.

At the technical level, there is the National Association of Water and Sanitation Entities (ANEAS) of Mexico, comprised of operating agencies, institutions, and companies related to the sector. Although it participates in technical and legislative discussions, the academic pointed out that it does not directly involve users or communities.

Citizen participation is channeled through the Metropolitan Citizen Council of the Institute for Planning and Management of Development in the Guadalajara Metropolitan Area (Imeplan). This body formulates observations and proposals, but these are not binding on the authorities. An initiative presented in the Jalisco Congress seeks to give it greater influence in water-related decisions.

A system vulnerable to pollution

Before the closure of the Las Pintas dam, more than 60 percent of the water consumed by the Guadalajara Metropolitan Area (AMG) came from Lake Chapala. That is, almost two out of every three liters arrived from that source via the Chapala-Guadalajara aqueduct and the so-called old system.

The latter began operating in 1957 and runs for approximately 92 kilometers in the open air. The water flowing from the lake continues along the Santiago River and through the Atequiza and Las Pintas canals until it reaches the dam of the same name. From there, it is channeled to the city's water treatment plant system.

Throughout its course, the water flows through agricultural, industrial, and residential areas, jeopardizing water quality. In the agricultural zone, runoff irrigation persists, raising the risk of fertilizers and other chemicals entering the system. Between the Atequiza and Las Pintas canals lies a corridor with approximately 300 industries, while the final stretch is characterized by intense urban sprawl. Somoza noted that roughly 150 illegal discharges have been identified along the route. These issues are compounded by insufficient oversight, weak enforcement, clandestine water connections, and decades of neglect in the maintenance of dams, canals, and other infrastructure. A season of heavy rains, combined with the pollution generated by the aforementioned activities, caused wastewater systems to overflow, carrying debris into the Las Pintas dam and supply canals like the Atequiza canal. This revealed the presence of polluting discharges, the contents of which ultimately reached homes.

Closing the dam's floodgates prevented the contaminated water from continuing its journey to the city's water treatment plants. However, the drop in the reservoir's water level exposed accumulated trash, sediment, weeds, and other debris. The community organization Un Salto de Vida (A Leap of Life) reported that the sludge extracted during the dredging operations was being dumped on land in El Salto, Tlaquepaque, and Tlajomulco. "Why is this solution of cleaning with heavy machinery given so much priority? Because it has significant economic interests. All of this machinery would otherwise be sitting idle, failing to recoup its investment," Somoza added.

As long as illegal dumping continues and compliance with regulations by industries, agricultural activities, and real estate developments is not monitored, waste will accumulate again.

The shutdown of the old system also altered the water supply for the Guadalajara Metropolitan Area: now, approximately 50 percent of the water comes from Lake Chapala, 22 percent from the Calderón system, and 28 percent from metropolitan wells. “The authorities have not informed us what the effects of this overload will be on the wells and the Verde River system during these months that the old system is closed.”

Replacing an aging network

The system's failures don't end when the water enters the treatment plants. It must then pass through regulating tanks and travel through an extensive network of pipes before reaching homes.

According to data from SIAPA, presented to the Jalisco Congress and retrieved by the academic, 66 percent of the approximately 8,600 kilometers that make up the agency's network are at least 30 years old. This means that much of the infrastructure has already exceeded its useful life, which can lead to leaks, breaks, and sediment buildup. Its deterioration also makes it difficult to identify where water quality changes, since contaminants can be present at the source, introduced during transport, or accumulate in the pipes that run through the city.

Although some sections have telemetry and modern measurement methods, this technology diminishes as the water flows deeper into residential areas. Many valves are still opened and closed manually by workers, who determine distribution times based on their experience and knowledge of the network.

The lack of sectorization and accurate information explains why the announced water rationing schedules don't always coincide with the times and areas where water actually arrives. According to the presenter, equipping the entire service area with hydrometry systems and proper sectorization would require an investment of approximately one billion pesos.

In October 2026, the federal and state governments announced a joint investment of nearly 25 billion pesos. The plan includes the construction of an alternative aqueduct to the existing Chapala-Guadalajara system, the pipeline between Calderón and San Gaspar, the expansion of the San Gaspar water treatment plant, and the modernization of the PP1 pipeline.

However, Somoza believes that no single investment will resolve the conflict as long as illegal discharges, weak sanctions, and a lack of coordination among authorities persist. Furthermore, the announced projects do not include the repair or replacement of Siapa's aging urban water network.
To estimate the cost of its renovation, the academic presented a parametric calculation based on the approximately 8,600 kilometers of pipes that make up the system. Considering a cost of 1,000 pesos per meter to open streets and sidewalks, replace the pipes, and subsequently repair the pavement, he estimated that replacing the entire network would cost 8.6 billion pesos.

He reiterated that water planning should not be limited to building infrastructure to incorporate new sources of supply. It must also address the deterioration of the network and promote the reuse and harvesting of rainwater.

Decentralize and make transparent

According to the academic, one alternative is to decentralize the water supply, so that homes and buildings can meet some of their needs without relying exclusively on the public network. One option is rainwater harvesting through rainwater harvesting systems, which can reduce the demand for potable water for activities such as cleaning, irrigation, and toilet use. It also provides a supplementary source during temporary supply interruptions.

The academic pointed out that Guadalajara's urban planning should move towards a water-sensitive city model, that is, a city that places the water cycle at the center of its decisions. This implies reducing consumption, reusing water, protecting waterways, controlling discharges, and coordinating urban growth with water availability.

In addition to technical solutions, he emphasized the importance of citizen participation. He recommended consulting the monitoring system of the State Water Commission, which takes monthly measurements in various bodies of water in Jalisco and allows users to download the available information.
He also suggested submitting transparency requests, since “they are the best weapon a citizen has. I recommend doing so without fear and with the mindset that the authority owes you the information.”